NYLS Law Review
Volume 58
Issue 2 Freedom of Choice at the End of Life:
Patients’ Rights in a Shifting Legal and Political
Landscape

Article 13

January 2014

In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation
ALEXANDER M. NOBLE
New York Law School, 2014

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
ALEXANDER M. NOBLE, In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
(2013-2014).

This Case Comments is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted
for inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 58 | 2013/14

VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
ALEXANDER M. NOBLE

In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent
Litigation
58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 473 (2013–2014)

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Alexander M. Noble is a 2014 J.D. candidate at New York Law School.

473

IN RE INNOVATIO IP VENTURES, LLC PATENT LITIGATION

Anyone who has accessed the Internet through a public wireless network1 may
well have been the victim of a data interception technique called “packet sniffing.”2
Packet sniffing is an increasingly common method of capturing data from personal
devices that use wireless, or “Wi-Fi,” networks to access the Internet. 3 Wi-Fi
networks connect devices such as laptops and smartphones to the Internet by sending
packets of data back and forth between Internet-capable devices and the network’s
router.4 Using a machine called a “packet analyzer,” third parties can capture and
decode these data packets to reveal the personal information that they contain.5
Once decoded, packet data reveals two types of information: “header” data,
which shows the addresses of the devices that transmitted the packets; and “payload”
data, which consists of emails, pictures, passwords, and any other substantive
information that network users are accessing, receiving, or sending online at the time
of capture.6 Packet analyzers are compact and commercially sold,7 and they also
provide third parties with a panoramic view of all user activity on a given Wi-Fi
network. Considering the surging popularity of public Wi-Fi networks in the United
States,8 the legality of packet sniffing has major implications for the right to privacy
in the Internet age.
1.

In a 2012 study from Identitytheft.org, 78% of survey respondents had used public Wi-Fi at least once
within the last twelve months. Press Release, Identity Theft Res. Ctr., Identity Theft and Public WiFi
Linked in Consumer Minds (Oct. 19, 2012), available at http://archive-org.com/page/504527/2012-1023/http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/publish/lib_survey/Public-WiFi-Usage-Survey.shtml.

2.

See Prabhaker Mateti, Hacking Techniques in Wireless Networks, in The Handbook of Information
Security 83, 85–87 (Hossein Bidgoli ed., 2005), available at http://www.cs.wright.edu/~pmateti/
InternetSecurity/Lectures/WirelessHacks/Mateti-WirelessHacks.doc (“Sniffing is eavesdropping on
the network. A (packet) sniffer is a program that intercepts and decodes network traffic broadcast
through a medium. Sniffing is the act by a machine S of making copies of a network packet sent by
machine A intended to be received by machine B.”).

3.

See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It,
72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208, 1231 (2004) (describing a packet sniffer as “a surveillance tool that sits at
a point on the network and scans and then filters passing Internet traffic”).

4.

See Susan Landau, Digital Age Communications Law Reform: National Security on the Line, 4 J. Telecomm.
& High Tech. L. 409, 424 (2006) (“[T]he Internet is a ‘packet-switched’ network. In such networks,
fixed circuits are not dedicated for the duration of a communication. Instead, the data that is transmitted,
whether files, email, Instant Messages, voice, is broken into small packets. Each packet travels its own
route over the Internet. The entire set of contents is reassembled when it is received at the other end.
The technology of packet routing creates some differences with circuit-switched technology.”).

5.

See What Is a Network Packet Analyzer, SolarWinds, http://www.solarwinds.com/it-managementglossary/what-is-network-packet-analyzer.aspx (last visited Dec. 21, 2013).

6.

See Payload, TechTerms.com, http://www.techterms.com/definition/payload (last visited Dec. 21,
2013).

7.

See Riverbed Technology Product Catalog, Riverbed, http://www.cacetech.com/products/catalog/ (last
visited Dec. 21, 2013) (listing a basic packet capture device for a retail price of $198).

8.

There are 245,203,319 Internet users in the United States, which amounts to roughly 78.1% of the
population. See Internet Users in North America, Internet World Stats: Usage & Population
Statistics, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats14.htm (last updated June 30, 2012). Wigle.net, a
database of user-reported Wi-Fi networks, lists over 16 million networks, and that is likely a small
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In In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois held that federal wiretapping laws do not prohibit
third parties from intercepting packet data sent over public Wi-Fi networks.9 Title I
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), also known as the Wiretap
Act,10 ordinarily imposes criminal and civil liability on any person who intentionally
intercepts electronic communications without authorization.11 However, the court in
Innovatio determined that the interception of packet data falls within an exception to
liability in section 2511(2)(g)(i) of the Wiretap Act (the “G1 exception”), which
permits third parties to intercept communications that are “readily accessible to the
general public.”12 The court held that because packet data sent over public Wi-Fi
networks is “readily accessible to the general public,” the G1 exception permits third
parties to intercept it without violating the Wiretap Act.13
In the court’s view, packet data qualified as “readily accessible to the general
public” because members of the public could gain access to the data through the use
of packet analyzer technology.14 To reach this conclusion, the court focused solely on
whether technology makes it possible for third parties to intercept a particular
communication, while ignoring the intent of network users to keep their data private.
This case comment contends that by failing to consider user intent, the court in
Innovatio formulated an overly broad and circular definition of the phrase “readily
accessible to the general public”15 that unduly expands the G1 exception and erodes
the Wiretap Act’s distinction between public and private communications, thereby

fraction of the total number of Wi-Fi networks in use. See Predrag Klasnja et al., “When I Am on Wi–Fi,
I Am Fearless”: Privacy Concerns & Practices in Everyday Wi–Fi Use, CHI 2009, available at http://
appanalysis.org/jjung/jaeyeon-pub/FormativeUserStudy4CHI.pdf.
9.

See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 886 F. Supp. 2d 888, 894 (N.D. Ill. 2012).

10.

Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511–22 (2012). After the statute’s initial passage
in 1968, Congress subsequently amended sections 2511–22, which comprise Title I, and renamed them
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. See Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 213–25
(1968). This case comment follows the practice of most courts by referring to sections 2511–22 as the
Wiretap Act rather than the ECPA.

11.

18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (providing that any person who “intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept,
or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication . . . shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject to suit as provided
in subsection (5)”).

12.

Id. § 2511(2)(g)(i).

13.

See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 892.

14.

The court noted that “[w]ith a packet capture adapter and the software, along with a basic laptop
computer, any member of the general public within range of an unencrypted Wi-Fi network can begin
intercepting communications sent on that network.” Id. at 893.

15.

The court reduced the G1 exception to a tautology: intercepting unsecured Wi-Fi communications
should be legal because the public can use packet analyzers to access them, and packet analyzers are
accessible to the public because it is not illegal to possess them. The invasive use of a surveillance
technology should not be legal merely because the technology itself is legal to possess.
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diminishing the privacy of individual users and undermining the integrity of public
Wi-Fi networks.16
The plaintiff, Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC (“Innovatio”) is a Delaware-based
company that owns a portfolio of thirty-one patents for wireless Internet products.17
In 2011, Innovatio filed a series of patent infringement suits against a number of
hotels, restaurant chains, and businesses that use its wireless Internet products.18 The
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation then consolidated all claims and parties
into a single action in the Northern District of Illinois.19 Before the district court,
Innovatio argued that the defendants committed patent infringement by using
Innovatio’s patented products to provide free wireless Internet access to customers of
the defendants’ businesses.20
As the case proceeded to discovery, Innovatio revealed that it had been collecting
evidence of the alleged infringement by using packet analyzers to sniff the defendants’
Wi-Fi networks. 21 Innovatio contended that the information it collected through
packet sniffing, such as the number of users of the defendants’ networks, would
assist in proving its infringement claims.22 The court, however, expressed concern
that Innovatio’s “sniffing protocol” involved the use of packet analyzers to capture
data from the devices of users accessing the defendants’ networks and may have
intercepted private communications in violation of the Wiretap Act.23 Innovatio was

16.

Former Federal Communications Commission Chairman Julius Genachowski proposed creating a
system of “WiFi networks across the nation, so powerful and broad in reach that consumers could use
them to make calls or surf the Internet without paying a cellphone bill every month.” Cecilia Kang,
Tech, Telecom Giants Take Sides as FCC Proposes Large Public WiFi Networks, Wash. Post (Feb. 3, 2013),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-03/business/36728627_1_wif i-networks-wirelessindustry-wireless-networks; see also Press Release, Wi-Fi Alliance, Wi-Fi Alliance Applauds New FCC
Milestone Toward the Release of Additional Spectrum for Wi-Fi (Feb. 25, 2013), available at http://
www.wi-fi.org/media/press-releases/wi-fi-alliance%C2%AE-applauds-new-fcc-milestone-towardrelease-additional-spectrum.

17.

See Raymond P. Niro, Setting the Record Straight on the Innovatio Patent Portfolio, IPWatchdog (Mar.
21, 2012, 3:41 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/21/setting-the-record-straight-on-theinnovatio-patent-portfolio/id=22964/; see also Gregory Thomas, Innovatio’s Infringement Suit Rampage
Expands to Corporate Hotels, The Patent Examiner (Sept. 30, 2011), http://patentexaminer.
org/2011/09/innovatios-infringement-suit-rampage-expands-to-corporate-hotels/.

18.

See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 889; see also Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Innovatio IP
Ventures, LLC, 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 907 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (noting that since February 2011, Innovatio
had sent over 8,000 letters to users of its wireless products in all fifty states, alleging patent infringement
and demanding payment for a license).

19.

See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (J.P.M.L. 2011) (mem.); see
also Motorola Solutions, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 909 (addressing allegations that Innovatio had filed twentythree “sham” lawsuits against companies who refused to buy a license).

20. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 889.
21.

See id. at 890.

22.

See id.

23.

Id.
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therefore directed by the court to produce a detailed description of how its sniffing
protocol operated for purposes of determining compliance with the Wiretap Act.24
Innovatio’s sniffing protocol consisted of sending its technicians onto the
defendants’ premises during normal business hours to acquire packet data from their
wireless networks.25 The technicians accessed the networks with laptops and then
used packet analyzers26 to capture data from the devices of the defendants’ customers
and members of the public who were also accessing the networks at that time.27 As is
often the case when third parties sniff a Wi-Fi network, neither the defendants nor
the individuals on the network were aware that Innovatio’s technicians had
intercepted their data.28 The packet analyzers acquired packet data from all wireless
devices communicating with the targeted networks, including laptops, smartphones,
and tablet computers.29
After obtaining and storing the data packets, the technicians decoded them using
a packet analyzer program called “Wireshark,” which revealed both the header and
payload information stored within the data.30 The header information, which Innovatio
claimed would assist in proving its patent infringement claims, showed that a number
of the defendants’ customers had in fact accessed the wireless networks operated with
the patented products.31 However, the decoded packets also revealed all of the payload
data that the network users were accessing at the time of capture, including their
“e-mails, pictures, videos, passwords, financial information, [and] private documents.”32
Upon review, the court determined that—despite Innovatio’s capture of network
users’ personal information without their knowledge or consent—the sniffing
protocol did not violate the Wiretap Act.33 The court therefore authorized Innovatio
to continue using packet analyzers to intercept packet data from customers using the
defendants’ Wi-Fi networks.34
24.

See id.

25.

See id.

26. See id. at 893 (stating that Innovatio’s technicians used a specific packet analyzer model called the

Riverbed AirPcap Nx packet capture adapter, which is available online for public purchase); see also
Riverbed Technology Product Catalog, supra note 7.
27.

See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 890.

28. See What Is a Packet Sniffer and How Does It Work?, Spamlaws.com, http://www.spamlaws.com/how-

packet-sniffers-work.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2013) (“Hackers often use packet sniffers because they
are very difficult to detect and can be installed in almost any location on the network.”); What Is a Packet
Sniffer?, WiseGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.org/what-is-a-packet-sniffer.htm (last visited Dec. 21,
2013) (“This type of packet sniffer is very hard to detect because it generates no traffic of its own.”).
29. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 890.
30. See id.
31.

See id.

32.

Id.

33.

See id. at 894.

34. See id. at 895 (holding that “Innovatio may collect information from the defendants’ public-facing Wi-Fi

networks according to its proposed protocol”).
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The court held that while a third party’s non-consensual interception of private
data ordinarily violates the Wiretap Act, Innovatio’s acquisition of packet data did not
because its sniffing protocol fell within the G1 exception, which makes it lawful to
intercept an “electronic communication made through an electronic communication
system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to
the general public.”35 At the outset, the court determined that the phrase “readily
accessible to the general public” should be interpreted according to its ordinary
meaning.36 In determining whether the packet data at issue was “readily accessible to
the general public” within the ordinary meaning of the phrase, the court noted that the
wireless networks from which it had been intercepted did not require users to provide a
password to connect.37 As the court accurately explained, however, whether the network
is “readily accessible to the general public,” is not the relevant inquiry under the G1
exception.38 According to the precise language of the statute, the question under the
G1 exception is whether the network is configured in such a way that the electronic
communications it transmits are “readily accessible to the general public.”39
It is exceedingly important to preserve the distinction between a network’s
accessibility and the accessibility of the communications it transmits in the context of
public wireless networks. Public Wi-Fi networks are not password protected because
their purpose is to make the Internet freely accessible to members of the public.
However, when Internet users connect to public Wi-Fi networks to send emails or
visit websites, they still retain a strong expectation of privacy, despite their knowledge
that others are also free to communicate over the network.40 While the network itself
is intended to be freely accessed, the communications sent over it are not.
Although the Innovatio court initially recognized the need to analyze the
accessibility of the networks and communications sent over them separately, it did
not preserve that distinction in its subsequent analysis under the G1 exception.
Instead, the court mistakenly relied on the network’s public-facing features to decide
the separate question of whether the transmitted packet data was “readily accessible
to the general public.” With respect to the applicability of the G1 exception to the
communications at issue, the court emphasized that the defendants’ Wi-Fi networks
lacked password protection, “allowing any customer who so desires to access the
Internet through them.”41 In explaining why this feature of the network was relevant
to whether the communications were publicly accessible, Chief Judge Holderman
observed that, once connected, any user connected to the network could use a packet
35.

Id. at 892 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2012)).

36. See id. at 892 n.5.
37.

See id. at 892.

38. Id.
39.

18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).

40. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 894 (noting that users of unencrypted Wi-Fi networks

have a strong expectation of privacy in their online communications).
41.

Id. at 892.
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analyzer to capture other packet data traveling over the network.42 The court found
it noteworthy that Innovatio’s own technicians used a packet analyzer device “which
is available to the public for purchase for $698.00.”43 Based on the lack of any security
measures to block the public from initially accessing the networks in question, the
court concluded that the ability to intercept packet data from the networks rendered
the data “readily accessible to the general public.”44
In support of its holding that packet data is “readily accessible to the general
public,” the court paradoxically noted that the vast majority of the public is unaware
that packet analyzers even exist.45 To dispatch the apparent contradiction that
members of the public can have ready access to communications through a technology
that they do not know exists, Chief Judge Holderman reasoned that “[t]he public’s
lack of awareness of the ease with which unencrypted Wi-Fi communications can be
intercepted by a third party is, however, irrelevant to a determination of whether
those communications are ‘readily accessible to the general public.’”46 The court
pointed out that “[t]he language of the exception does not, after all, refer to
‘communications that the general public knows are readily available to the general
public.’”47 Consequently, the chief judge concluded that Innovatio’s interception was
permissible under the G1 exception “to the extent Innovatio’s proposed sniffing
protocol accesses only communications sent over unencrypted Wi-Fi networks
available to the general public.”48
The Innovatio court’s interpretation of the G1 exception is legally flawed for
three reasons. First, no other court in the United States has interpreted the G1
exception to mean that a third party’s ability to carry out an interception—without
more—is sufficient to render a communication “readily accessible to the general
public.” Second, the court failed to recognize that Congress designed the G1
exception to apply to a narrow category of communications that are intentionally
configured to be intercepted by the public. Third, the court’s interpretation of the
G1 exception contravenes the plain meaning of the statutory language by conflating
communications that are “readily accessible” with those that are merely “accessible.”
The court’s interpretation broadened the G1 exception to authorize the interception
of any and all communications made over Wi-Fi networks lacking password
protection—including home Wi-Fi networks that are configured exclusively for
private use. Instead, the district court should have interpreted the scope of the G1
42.

See id. at 893 (“With a packet capture adapter and the software, along with a basic laptop computer, any
member of the general public within range of an unencrypted Wi-Fi network can begin intercepting
communications sent on that network.”).

43.

Id.

44. See id.
45.

See id.

46. Id. at 894 (“[T]he public’s expectation of privacy in a particular communication is irrelevant to the

application of the Wiretap Act as currently written.”).
47.

Id.

48. Id.
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exception to include only those communications that are intended to be publicly
accessible without the use of specialized surveillance technology.
First, rulings on the G1 exception from courts in other jurisdictions demonstrate
that the Innovatio court misinterpreted the G1 exception by applying it to the
interception of packet data. Courts interpreting the Wiretap Act have consistently
recognized that the G1 exception does not permit the interception of electronic
communications that are intended to remain private, even when the public possesses
the technological capability to intercept them. In In re Google Inc. Street View
Electronic Communications Litigation, a district court held that packet data falls
outside the G1 exception based on an extensive examination of the legislative history
of the Wiretap Act.49 In United States v. Ahrndt, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the G1 exception did not authorize police officers to intercept
files from unsecured wireless networks, reversing a lower court decision based on a
broad reading of the G1 exception.50 And in Tapley v. Collins, a district court held
that proper application of the G1 exception must account for both the intent of the
network operator and the expectations of the individuals communicating over the
network.51 Each case is discussed in turn.
In Google Street View, the plaintiffs brought a consolidated class action lawsuit
against defendant Google for allegedly violating the Wiretap Act by intercepting
packet data from their home wireless networks.52 The action arose from Google
sending its employees into residential areas to intercept packet data from the residents’
non-password-protected Wi-Fi networks during data collection for the Google Street
View Project.53 The data intercepted from the plaintiffs’ networks contained email
addresses, usernames, passwords, and other private data.54 Google moved to dismiss
the plaintiffs’ claims under the Wiretap Act, arguing that the G1 exception
authorized them to intercept the plaintiffs’ data because the data packets were
accessible to any third party with a packet analyzer.55 In denying Google’s motion to
dismiss, the court held that the plaintiffs’ data was not “readily accessible to the
general public” despite the possibility that members of the public were capable of
intercepting it with packet analyzers.56
Under the Google Street View court’s interpretation of the G1 exception, packet
data does not lose its protection against wiretapping merely because members of the
49. See In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1078–81 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
50. See United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994, at *7 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010), rev’d, 475

F. App’x 656 (9th Cir. 2012).
51.

See Tapley v. Collins, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1373 (S.D. Ga. 1999).

52.

See In re Google Inc. St. View, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; see also Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
18 U.S.C. § 2511–22 (2012).

53.

See In re Google Inc. St. View, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.

54. See id. at 1071–72.
55.

See id.

56. See id. at 1082–83.
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public can intercept it with packet analyzers.57 Chief Judge Ware explained that
while the networks themselves were accessible to the public because the plaintiffs
chose not to password protect them, the “networks . . . were configured such that the
packets were not readable by the general public without the use of sophisticated
packet sniffer technology.”58 The court further acknowledged that packet sniffers
were a type of “sophisticated decoding and processing technology” and “outside the
purview of the general public.”59 Based on its assessment that the packet analyzers
required specialized technical knowledge to operate and members of the general
public rarely use them, the court concluded that unsecured packet data could not be
considered “readily accessible to the general public.”60
In Google Street View, the court based its narrow construction of the G1 exception
on the Wiretap Act’s legislative history.61 The court used congressional intent as a
guide to decide whether the G1 exception, which Congress created in 1986—prior to
the spread of wireless Internet technology—could be appropriately applied in the
context of Wi-Fi communications. 62 Because Congress did not have Wi-Fi
communications in mind when it drafted the G1 exception, the Google Street View
court sought to answer the question of whether the G1 exception could be properly
applied by drawing an analogy between Wi-Fi communications and a type of
technology that Congress did have in mind when it created the exception. After
consulting reports on the 1986 amendments to the Wiretap Act from the Senate and
House of Representatives, Chief Judge Ware determined that Wi-Fi networks were
analogous to early cellular phone networks, which Congress intended to protect in
the Wiretap Act despite the ability of third parties to intercept them with radio
scanners.63 Despite the public’s ability to eavesdrop on these calls, Congress intended
to extend privacy protection to these communications because they were sent over
cell phones networks “designed to send communications privately, as in solely to
selected recipients.”64 In the court’s view, “Wi-Fi technology shares a common design
with cellular phone technology . . . in that both types of technology are architected
in order to make intentional monitoring by third parties difficult.”65 Based on this
analogy between Wi-Fi and early cell phone networks, Chief Judge Ware concluded
57.

See id. at 1071.

58. Id. at 1082.
59.

Id. at 1082–83.

60. See id. at 1082.
61.

See id. at 1078.

62. See id. at 1076 (“The drafting of these provisions predated the spread of wireless internet technologies . . . .”).
63. In the 1980s, the primitive state of cellular phones made it possible to intercept calls with legal,

commercially sold radio-scanning equipment. See S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3561.
64. In re Google Inc. St. View, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1082–83; see also S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 7–8 (noting that “unlike

many signals which are more commonly scanned, the design of the cellular telephone system makes the
intentional monitoring of specific calls more difficult because they are handed off among cells”).
65.

In re Google Inc. St. View, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1082–83.
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that the legislative intent behind the G1 exception precluded its application in the
context of Wi-Fi communications.66
In Google Street View, the court’s reliance on the legislative history of the G1
exception produced a more sensible interpretation of the phrase “readily accessible to
the general public” as it applies to packet data. Unlike the court’s truncated analysis of
packet analyzers in Innovatio, the Google Street View court did not end its analysis when
it found that packet analyzers give the public the power to intercept packet data;67
rather, the Google Street View court held that the G1 exception could not authorize the
interception of packet data after finding that members of the public generally lack the
technical knowledge and skills required to intercept it.68 Moreover, the level of
sophistication required of third parties to capture data from Wi-Fi networks reflected
the intent of network designers to make third-party interception more difficult, which
the Innovatio court failed to consider.69 Given its acknowledgement that the vast
majority of the public is unaware that packet analyzers even exist, the Innovatio court
should have followed the approach taken by the Google Street View court and construed
the G1 exception more narrowly to exclude packet data.
At least one other court has rejected application of the G1 exception to unsecured
Wi-Fi communications, doing so in a Fourth Amendment context. In United States v.
Ahrndt, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of a lower court that closely resembled
the holding in Innovatio.70 In Ahrndt, police officers accessed the defendant’s unsecured
wireless network, where they were able to locate child pornography files in the shared
iTunes library of the defendant’s computer.71 When the defendant moved to suppress
the files on the grounds that the police obtained them in violation of the Wiretap Act,
the district court held that the G1 exception authorized the interception because the
files were “readily accessible to the general public.” 72 The court concluded that the
defendant’s non-password-protected Wi-Fi network was “configured so that any
electronic communications emanating from his computer via his iTunes program were
readily accessible to any member of the general public with a Wi-Fi enabled laptop.”73
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed in an unpublished opinion, finding that
the evidence failed to establish that the defendant intentionally configured his files
66. See id. at 1083.
67.

See id. at 1082–83.

68. See id. at 1083.
69. See id. at 1084.
70. Compare United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010), rev’d, 475

F. App’x 656 (9th Cir. 2012), with In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 886 F. Supp. 2d 888,
892–94 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
71.

See Ahrndt, 2010 WL 373994, at *7.

72. See id. at *8 (“The access, however, was not illegal under the ECPA. On the contrary, because the

wireless network and iTunes software were configured so that the general public could access them,
access was expressly lawful under the ECPA.”).
73. Id.
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for public access.74 Under the district court’s erroneous interpretation of the G1
exception, the defendant’s computer files qualified as “readily accessible to the
general public” because any member of the general public could access them with a
laptop.75 But the Ninth Circuit overruled this interpretation, holding that, in order to
lose privacy protection, there would need to be proof not only that the police officers
could access the defendant’s files, but that the defendant in fact took “affirmative
actions to enable open sharing in this manner.”76 The Ninth Circuit remanded the
case to the district court to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to establish
either that the defendant had intentionally configured his files for public access, or
that a program on the defendant’s computer could have automatically configured his
files to be accessible by others.77
In Ahrndt, the Ninth Circuit established an intent-based standard to determine
whether data sent over unsecured Wi-Fi networks is entitled to privacy protection.78
On remand, the district court applied this standard and granted the defendant’s
motion to suppress evidence obtained from his Wi-Fi network.79 The court noted
that—despite the defendant’s failure to password protect his wireless network—the
data available on his network was nevertheless entitled to privacy protection because
he intended for its contents to remain private.80 While the default configuration of
his network inadvertently rendered his data accessible to third parties, the court held
that such an inadvertent result did not legally permit third parties to access it.81
The Innovatio court repeated the Ahrndt court’s error by applying the G1
exception to Wi-Fi data without accounting for the network users’ intent. If the
Innovatio court had instead applied the Ninth Circuit’s intent-based standard to
determine whether Innovatio had violated the Wiretap Act, 82 it would have
recognized—as the Ninth Circuit did—that the ability of third parties to acquire
access to private communications does not make the capture of private data a legal
interception under the Wiretap Act.

74.

See Ahrndt, 475 F. App’x at 658.

75. See Ahrndt, 2010 WL 373994, at *8.
76. Ahrndt, 475 F. App’x at 657–58.
77.

See id. at 658.

78. See id.; see also United States v. Ahrndt, No. 00468-KI, 2013 WL 179326, at *7 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 2013)

(“[I]n response to the Ninth Circuit’s query, there is no evidence Ahrndt ‘intentionally’ enabled sharing
of his files over his wireless network.”).
79. See Ahrndt, 2013 WL 179326, at *12 (“Ahrndt’s Motion to Suppress evidence obtained from his storage

media and the statements he made to the agents is granted.”).
80. See id. at *6.
81.

See id. at *7 (“Here, the evidence suggests Ahrndt unknowingly, and by default of the program, shared
the content stored in his LimeWire folder over his home wireless network.”).

82. Given the court’s acknowledgement that the intercepted data contained private information such as

passwords, contents of emails, and other confidential material, accounting for intent would have
weighed heavily against a finding that the G1 exception applied.
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The intent-based reading of the G1 exception has further support in Tapley v.
Collins.83 In Tapley, the district court held that the G1 exception did not authorize
interception of cordless phone calls despite the fact that members of the public could
intercept them with radio scanners.84 Under the court’s interpretation in Tapley, the
G1 exception authorizes the interception of radio broadcasts intended for public use,
but does not extend to cordless phone calls because “cordless telephones were never
designed with that intent.”85 Tapley thus supports the proposition that courts should
not focus solely on whether the public can intercept communications “as a matter of
cost and practicality” when applying the G1 exception.86
As these cases demonstrate, the court in Innovatio cast the G1 exception too
broadly. By focusing solely on the public’s ability to intercept the data at issue, the
court disregarded important factors that other courts have found to be dispositive to
the G1 analysis. Rather, courts have reached narrower interpretations of the G1
exception when they account for the intent of the person who configured the
network. These interpretations are more sensible because they provide privacy
protection to communications which, despite eavesdroppers’ ability to access, were
never intended by either the network operator or the individuals sending them to fall
into public hands.
Furthermore, the legislative history of the Wiretap Act contradicts the Innovatio
court’s expansive interpretation of the G1 exception, leaving public Wi-Fi users
vulnerable to the exact type of privacy invasions that Congress sought to prevent
when it amended the statute to protect electronic communications.87 The legislative
history of the Wiretap Act reveals that Congress created G1 as an exception of
limited scope, authorizing the interception of a narrow class of communications
intended for public access.88 Yet reference to the legislative history of the G1 exception
is conspicuously absent from the court’s opinion.
Congress enacted the Wiretap Act in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968,89 which prohibited the interception of oral and wire
communications subject to three exceptions for law enforcement and
83. See Tapley v. Collins, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1373 (S.D. Ga. 1999).
84. See id. at 1373.
85. Id.
86. Orin Kerr, District Court Rules That the Wiretap Act Does Not Prohibit Intercepting Unencrypted Wireless

Communications, The Volokh Conspiracy (Sept. 6, 2012, 7:08 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/09/06/
district-court-rules-that-the-wiretap-act-does-not-prohibit-intercepting-unencrypted-wirelesscommunications/#.
87.

Compare S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559 (suggesting that
the lack of privacy protection may discourage the public’s use of Wi-Fi), with In re Innovatio IP
Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 886 F. Supp. 2d 888, 894 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (holding that the public’s
expectation of privacy is irrelevant to the application of the Wiretap Act).

88. The Google Street View and Tapley courts also grounded their narrow interpretation of the G1 exception

in the legislative history of the Wiretap Act. See In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794
F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2011); see also Tapley, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1373.
89. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 1.
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telecommunications personnel.90 In 1986, Congress amended the Wiretap Act to
add protection for electronic as well as wire and oral communications.91 As currently
written, the Act defines an “electronic communication” as “any transfer of signs,
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce.” 92 In Innovatio, the court
concluded that because Wi-Fi networks transmit information using radio waves,
packet data qualifies as “electronic communications” under the Wiretap Act.93
Congressional reports accompanying the 1986 amendments to the Wiretap Act
clarify that Congress intended the G1 exception to apply to a limited class of
communications. The G1 exception states that “[i]t shall not be unlawful . . . for any
person to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an electronic
communication system that is configured so that such electronic communication is
readily accessible to the general public.”94 According to the House Report, Congress
intended the word “configure” to “establish an objective standard of design
configuration to begin determining whether a system receives privacy protection.”95
Rather than casting the exception so broadly that it encompasses all communications
capable of being accessed by the public, Congress deliberately worded the G1 exception
to include only communications that are “designed” to be “readily accessible to the
general public.”96 Although Congress did not state whether communications must be
intentionally designed for public access, the examples that it provided suggest that the
intent of the network designer is important to the G1 analysis.97
In discussing which types of communications qualify as “readily accessible to the
general public,” Congress referred exclusively to communications intentionally
transmitted for public use.98 The Senate Report states that under the G1 exception,
“it would not be unlawful to intercept subcarrier and [V]BI communications that are
transmitted for the use of the general public. Such ‘public’ communications would
include the stereo subcarrier used in FM broadcasting or data carried on the VBI to
provide closed-captioning of TV programming for the hearing-impaired.”99 The first
90. See S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 37 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153–54.
91.

Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as
amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–21, 2701–10, 3121–26 (2012)).

92.

18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012).

93.

In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 886 F. Supp. 2d 888, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“Neither
party disputes that the allegedly infringing Wi-Fi networks transmit information using radio waves
(which are a type of electromagnetic radiation), and thus transmit electronic communications.”).

94. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).
95. H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 41 (1986). The Senate Report contains nearly identical language. See S. Rep.

No. 99-541, at 18 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3572.
96. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 18.
97.

See id. at 18–19.

98. See id.
99. Id.

485

IN RE INNOVATIO IP VENTURES, LLC PATENT LITIGATION

example refers to stereo subcarriers, which is a type of FM radio broadcast used to
transmit dual sets of audio signals to FM radios that allows listeners to play sound in
“stereo” rather than merely in “mono.”100 The second refers to VBI communications,
or vertical blanking interval—the portion of a television broadcast carrying
“information other than video or audio, such as closed-caption text and stock market
data.”101 Both examples reference communications that were created for the purpose
of public use and designed to be accessible with ordinary consumer electronics. FM
subcarriers are designed to be detectable with any standard FM radio and VBI
communications can be detected by any standard television set.102 The House Report
also contains a third example of communications that Congress considered to be
“readily accessible to the general public,” stating that “[a]n example of systems which
are readily accessible include[s] loud speakers hooked up to a telephone system.”103
These are the only three examples of “readily accessible” communications that
Congress provided. Through exclusive reference to communications that have been
intentionally configured for public access, Congress indicated that the parameters of
the G1 exception were narrowly drawn. When accessing the communication requires
an electronic device, the communication is accessible with the minimum technology
ordinarily used to receive communications in that medium, such as a standard FM
radio or television.104 Taken together, these examples make clear that Congress
intended to limit the scope of the G1 exception to communications that are readily
accessible to the public without the use of specialized surveillance hardware.
Congress would thus reject the broad interpretation of the G1 exception adopted
by the court in Innovatio. Congress had the opportunity to include within the G1
exception all communications that the public might gain access to, but deliberately
cast the exception more narrowly. By example and explanation, Congress illustrated
that communications must be intentionally designed for public use to qualify as
“readily accessible to the general public.”105 In light of the legislative history of the G1
exception, the Innovatio court should have construed the G1 exception to exclude
packet data, which contains personal information intended to remain private and
cannot be accessed without surveillance equipment outside the knowledge of ordinary
network users.
100. See Subcarriers in F.M. Broadcasting, Dayton Indus. Corp., http://www.daytonindustrial.com/scasub.

htm (last updated Oct. 16, 1998); see also Broadcast Radio Subcarriers or Subsidiary Communications
Authority (SCA), Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/broadcast-radiosubcarriers-or-subsidiary-communications-authority-sca (last visited Dec. 21, 2013) (describing a
subcarrier as a “separate audio or data channel that is transmitted along with the main audio signal over
a broadcast station”).
101. Margaret Rouse, Networking and Communications: Vertical Blanking Interval (VBI), WhatIs.com,

http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/vertical-blanking-interval-VBI (last updated Mar. 2011).
102. See id.
103. H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 41 (1986).
104. See id. at 9, 21, 47; see also Subcarriers in F.M. Broadcasting, supra note 100.
105. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 41.
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The court’s interpretation of the G1 exception is also vulnerable to a textualist
critique. In Innovatio, the court embraced an interpretation of the G1 exception that
contravenes the plain language of the Wiretap Act by ignoring a key term in the
statute.106 In order to adjust the definition of “readily accessible to the general public”
to include packet data, the court effectively erased the term “readily” from the
statute.107 The private information contained within packet data cannot be
characterized as “readily accessible” during its transmission over a Wi-Fi network.
Before third parties can access the content of another user’s data packets, they must
locate and connect to a wireless network, operate a packet analyzer to capture the
data, execute a program to record the data, and, finally, convert the data into a readable
format using additional software.108 Under the Innovatio court’s interpretation, any
communication will qualify as “readily accessible” if, theoretically, there exists some
combination of steps and technologies that would enable a third party to access it.
This interpretation of the G1 exception, under which the designation of a
communication as “readily accessible” is nearly automatic if the technology exists to
access it, places no limits whatsoever either on the number of affirmative steps that
third parties must take or on the level of specialized knowledge they must possess to
successfully intercept the communication. The court therefore engineered a definition
of the G1 exception that fails to distinguish between communications that are merely
“accessible” from those that qualify as “readily accessible.”109
The Innovatio interpretation of the G1 exception has also been subject to this
criticism in legal scholarship. For example, noted scholar Orin Kerr argues that
courts must account for the intent of the network designer when they apply the G1
exception because intent is implicit in the language of the statute.110 According to
Kerr, the phrase “configured so that such electronic communication is readily
accessible to the general public”111 clearly “focuses on the intent of the designer—the
person who does the configuring of the network so that it works a particular way—
to design the network so that the general public was supposed to be able to access
them.”112 Under Kerr’s reading, the G1 exception applies only when a network is “set
up consistently with a design that reflects an intent that members of the public would
be able to monitor those communications.”113
106. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 886 F. Supp. 2d 888, 893 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
107. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2012) (referring to communications

that are “readily accessible to the general public”).
108. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 893 (“The software necessary to analyze the data that

the packet capture adapters collect is available for download for free.”); see also Packet Sniffing Part 1,
SuraSoft, http://www.surasoft.com/articles/packetsniffing.php (last visited Dec. 21, 2013).
109. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 892.
110. See Kerr, supra note 86.
111. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).
112. Kerr, supra note 86.
113. Id.

487

IN RE INNOVATIO IP VENTURES, LLC PATENT LITIGATION

Instead, the Innovatio court’s interpretation of the G1 exception, an exception
that was designed to protect the public, inflicts the greatest harm on the general
public. Public Wi-Fi networks are widely recognized as a societal asset because they
provide fast and free Internet services that benefit the general public.114 The
advantages of public Wi-Fi networks cannot be achieved without user confidence in
the privacy of their personal data. The Innovatio court’s ruling, however, allows third
parties to intercept personal data as it travels over any network open to the public.
The court endorsed an interpretation of the Wiretap Act that will ultimately
“discourage potential customers from using innovative communications systems” and
prevent “American businesses from developing new innovative forms of
telecommunications and computer technology.” 115 Applying a less expansive
interpretation of the G1 exception would have protected the privacy of individual
users and preserved the integrity of public Wi-Fi networks, which are quickly
becoming a valuable commodity in an increasingly interconnected world.

114. The benefits of public Wi-Fi networks have been noted in the areas of innovation, business and

economic development, and emergency services. See Reasons for Open Wireless, Open Wireless
Movement, https://openwireless.org/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2013).
115. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559.
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